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conspicuously state that filling in a title, 
such as Mrs., Miss or Ms., is optional. 
When applying for credit a woman may 
use her birth-given surname on her 
birth-given surname hyphenated with 
her husband's name. Although not ex-
pressly permitted by the Act, a woman 
probably can still get credit using her 
husband's surname. If she chooses to 
use her husband's surname, however, 
she should be warned that the ensuing 
credit record will apply to him and she 
will not be establishing a credit history of 
her own. Application forms must also 
mention the existence of the Equal Cre-
dit Opportunity Act and provide the 
name and address of the agency in 
charge of enforcing the Act for each type 
of credit. 
After June 30, 1976 a woman may 
not be asked her marital status when ap-
plying for a separate unsecured account. 
Where an asset is pledged on a secured 
loan, however, the creditor may require 
the signature of any person who jointly 
holds title to that asset on the instrument 
giving the creditor rights to the collateral. 
A creditor may not, however, require a 
woman to supply a co-signer unless a 
man .would also be required to have a 
co-signer; nor maya creditor require a 
co-signer of an unmarried person where 
one would not be required for a married 
person. 
While the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act serves as a protective device, it is 
only effective if women learn how to 
apply it properly. Women still need to be 
educated as to the importance of obtain-
ing credit in their own names and the 
means by which they can obtain credit 
and build a good credit history. 
The time to get credit is when it is least 
needed. A good credit rating acts as a 
safeguard in times of emergency, such as 
sudden illness or death of a family 
member. This is also the worst time to try 
to get credit. 
Having credit in a spouse's name of-
fers virtually no protection, even if the 
card bears the wife's name, she is the 
only one to use it, and she pays the bills. 
If the husband dies or the couple is di-
vorced the account will be closed by the 
store. The wife will not be considered 
creditworthy. The same situation exists 
where credit is extended on the basis of 
the husband's credit record toward the 
purchase of a car or home despite the 
fact that the wife might be making all the 
monthly or mortgage payments. She 
may use the fact that she has been pay-
ing the bills to start new accounts but the 
old accounts will still be terminated. 
To begin building a healthy credit re-
cord a woman should start at a local de-
partment store. It is essential to apply for 
credit one place at a time. Multiple appli-
cations tend to lead creditors to believe a 
woman is about to embark on a shop-
ping spree. She should complete the ap-
plication forms carefully excluding any 
information on her husband or ex-
husband, other than a joint checking ac-
count number. When credit is extended 
it is best to begin by making small pur-
chases and paying fully and promptly. In 
counselling women on their credit rights 
it may be necessary to remind someone 
new to the area that the card must be 
used to establish a credit history. After 
four to six months the person should 
apply to one other local department 
store and again follow a careful routine 
of purchase and payment. After another 
four to six months a woman with an in-
come of $8,000 or more should apply to 
one of the major national credit cards. 
If credit is refused the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act provides that a person 
is entitled, upon request, to a written 
statement of the reasons for rejection. If 
the applicant suspects discrimination 
was involved in her rejection she will 
need a written statement of reasons as 
evidence in a suit. In addition, the sooner 
a written statement is obtained, the 
sooner the creditor will be pinned down 
to a specific set of reasons for rejection 
and will then be unable to add further 
reasons later. 
If rejection was caused by something 
unfavorable in a woman's credit record, 
she is entitled, under the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act, to be told what information 
is in her4ile free if she asks within thirty 
days of rejection. There is no right to a 
written report or to physically handle the 
file. In Maryland the largest consumer 
credit bureau is Credit Bureau Inc., 
which can be reached at 891-3100. If 
any information in the file is proven in-
correct it must be removed and creditors 
notified of its erroneous nature. If the 
applicant and credit bureau disagree 
over a piece of information the applicant 
has a right to have her side of the story 
placed in the file. This explanation must 
then be sent out with all future reports. 
If, after learning the reasons for rejec-
tion, an applicant feels the refusal was 
unjustified she should discuss the matter 
with the credit manager of the store or 
bank officer. If the credit manager or of-
ficer will not change his or her mind, 
Consumer HELP at 785-1001 will pro-
vide a counselor to help work out the 
problem. 
Persons interested in further informa-
tion on credit can contact the National 






by Kathleen M. Howard 
While attending the Seventh National 
Conference on Women and the Law I 
had occasion to hear Nan Hunter and 
Nancy Polikoff, both attorneys practing 
domestic law in Washington, D.C., 
speak on the problems and issues in-
volved in lesbian mother custody litiga-
tion. 
The seminar which the speakers con-
ducted outlined a battle plan for every at-
torney who is ever confronted with a les-
bian mother custody case. The panelists 
felt that the single factor which is most 
important in determining the success or 
failure of this type of litigation is the at-
torney; that is, an attorney who has 
some prejudice, no matter how latent, 
towards lesbian mothers, should not 
handle a custody case of this type. 
Before detailing the fine points of liti-
gation strategy, the panelists pOinted out 
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that prior to the filing of the case two pol-
icy decisions must be made by the les-
bian mother. The first decision is 
whether or not anyone should be told of 
the mother's lesbianism. On the one 
hand, custody determinations are never 
final, and if someone later finds that the 
mother is a lesbian, it would be relatively 
easy to establish a material change in cir-
cumstance justifying the revocation of 
the mother's custody. On the other 
hand, a mother who is straight" has a 
much better chance of being awarded 
custody of her children than a lesbian 
mother. Thus the choice must be made 
between' having an easy custody fight 
and risking a later challenge on the basis 
of a discovery of lesbianism, and reveal-
ing the facts at the beginning and facing a 
much tougher case. 
The second big decision is whether or 
not the client should mention a lover. It is 
quite clear that a judge is more likely to 
award custody to a lesbian mother 
where she is not practicing lesbianism; 
however, one must consider that a heal-
thy, well-adjusted mother will be best for 
her children, and part of being healthy 
and well-adjusted is having an outlet for 
sexual and emotional fulfillment. 
As a practical matter, the key to win-
ning a lesbian mother custody fight is to 
keep the case out of court. This is espe-
cially important when one realizes the 
very broad discretion which a trial judge 
has in determining the issue of custody; 
the standard which is used in determin-
ing the issue is simply the best interests of 
the child, however measured by the 
court, and a custody determination will 
not be overturned on appeal save for 
grave abuse. 
There are several tactical maneuvers 
which should be used in attempting to 
keep the fight out of court. The primary 
method for accomplishing this goal is to 
settle. Before attempting a settlement 
however, the motives of the challenging 
party, usually the father, should be 
evaluated. Once these motives have 
been determined, it will be easier to offer 
a compromise which will satisfy them 
and give the mother custody. For exam-
ple, where the father's actions are 
motivated by pecuniary conSiderations, 
a lesbian mother may be faced with a 
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deal such as limiting or eliminating child 
support in exchange for the father's 
promise not to challenge her custody. 
Each lesbian mother will have a different 
compromise level, but before rejecting 
what seems to be an extremely predjudi-
cial offer, the dangers of a judicial deter-
mination of custody should be stressed. 
If the challenging party refuses to set-
tle, the panelists advocate a course of ac-
tion which they termed' 'fighting fire with 
fire." This consists of collecting all ofthe 
dirt one can find on the challenging 
party, to be used as evidence at trial in 
determining the best interests of the 
child. Of course one should make clear 
to the other side that such dirt is available 
and perhaps then some eqUitable set-
tlement may be arranged. 
If no settlement is possible and the 
case comes to trial, the primary thing to 
remember is that a custody case is won 
or lost at the trial level. As stated before 
the only ground for reversal of a custody 
determination on appeal is grave abuse 
of discretion by the trial judge. Such 
abuse is unlikely to be found in most cus-
tody determinations, but especially un-
likely in cases involving a lesbian 
mother. 
At trial, the attorney for the lesbian 
mother should not allow the judge to 
focus on the mother's sexual prefer-
ences. It should be argued that no evi-
dence of lesbianism should be admitted 
unless it can be shown by the opposition 
that there is a nexus between the 
mother's sexual conduct and an adverse 
effect on the well being of the children. 
Unless such a connection can be shown, 
evidence of lesbianism is irrelevant to the 
issue of the best interests of the children. 
If it is decided that evidence of les-
bianism will be admissible the panelists 
stressed that the mother's attorney 
should be the first to make it an issue. 
This tactic is considered preferable to al-
lowing the opposition to bring it up be-
cause it avoids embarrassing questions 
which the judge or opposing counsel 
may pose to the mother. In bringing up 
the issue of lesbianism, the speakers 
suggested that an expert psychiatric wit-
ness should be produced. The witness 
should have preViously interviewed the 
mother and children and should be pre-
pared to testify as to the relationships be-
tween them. He should be prepared to 
testify as to the causes of lesbianism, the 
similarities between lesbian mothers and 
"straight" mothers, and as to specific in-
formation about the particular family 
unit and its acceptance of the situation. 
Both speakers acknowledged the dif-
ficulties involved in this type of custody 
litigation. Both admitted that in many 
cases a child may be stigmatized by a 
mother's open display of homosexual-
ity. In spite of these difficulties, the 
panelists thought that in many cases the 
children's interests will best be served by 
allowing them to remain with their 
mother. In such cases there is an over-
whelming need for competent attorneys 
who are willing and able to give the same 
quality of representation to a lesbian 







by Byron L. Warnken 
The Supreme Court, in an 8-0 deci-
sion in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 
Tax Comm'r. 96 S.Ct. 535 (1976) (Mr. 
Justice White, concurring in the judg-
ment), held that a nondiscriminatory ad 
valorem property tax levied against a 
wholesale inventory of imported tires 
was not an "impost" or "duty" on im-
ports, as prohibited by the "import-
export" clause, art. I, § 10, cl. 2 of the 
constitution. In the process, the Court 
overruled Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 29 (1871), which one hundred 
years earlier had held that such a"tax was 
constitutionally forbidden until such time 
as the imports became incorporated into 
the general mass of property within the 
state. 
Michelin Tire Corp. (petitioner) im-
